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THE IMMOBILE MOBILE HOME-BROWNFIELD
SUBDIVISION, INC. v. McKEE
As prices increase on conventional, site-built homes, more families are
considering the alternative of factory built housing: prefabricated, mod-
ular, sectional and mobile homes. Homes classified as "mobile" are
often restricted to trailer parks by zoning ordinances. In other cases
private covenants restrict the use of land by prohibiting mobile homes.
An Illinois court first had occasion to interpret such a covenant in
Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee.1 The decision is significant as
it establishes that a structure advertised as a mobile home and sold by
a mobile home dealer remains one regardless of the owner's intent to use
it as a permanent residence. The decision has adverse implications for
the future use of factory built housing. The purpose of this Note is to
analyze the court's decision in light of existing case law and to examine
its future impact.
Historically, mobile homes have been regulated either publicly by a
zoning ordinance' or privately by a restrictive covenant' or condition.
Often a county or municipal zoning ordinance will restrict the use of a
mobile home as a residence in areas other than licensed trailer parks4
or prohibit the use of a trailer for living accommodations in an area
1. 61 Ill.2d 168, 334 N.E.2d 131 (1975).
2. A history of "zoning ordinance" decisions is beyond the scope and necessity of this
Note, which will only delve into existing case law on zoning ordinances as it may relate
to the court's interpretation of covenants restricting such use. For a discussion of mobile
home zoning ordinance cases, see generally Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and
Taxation, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bartke & Gage]; Comment,
Mobile Homes in Kansas: A Need for Proper Zoning, 20 KAN. L. REV. 87 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Mobile Homes in Kansas]. It is clear that the owner's right to use
property for his or her own purpose is subject to the exercise of the police power. Under
the police power, municipalities have the right to adopt zoning ordinances imposing
reasonable restraints on the use of private property. A zoning ordinance, not clearly
arbitrary or unreasonable which bears a substantial relationship to public health, safety,
morals or general welfare is valid. See Village of LaGrange v. Leitch, 377 Ill. 139, 35
N.E.2d 346 (1941).
3. "A covenant is an agreement between the parties to do or not to do a particular act."
Leverich v. Roy, 402 Ill. 71, 73, 83 N.E.2d 335, 336 (1949). A covenant which restricts the
use of land is commonly referred to as a restrictive covenant. See McCarthy, Restrictive
Covenants, 1955 U. ILL. L. F. 709, 710 [hereinafter cited as McCarthy]. A restrictive
covenant need only be reasonable and not contrary to public policy to be enforced. See,
e.g., Brandenburg v. Lager, 272 Ill. 622, 112 N.E. 321 (1916); Corbridge v. Westminster
Presbyterian Church & Soc., 18 Ill.App.2d 245, 151 N.E.2d 822 (2d Dist. 1958).
4. See, e.g., Village of Cahokia v. Wright, 57 I1l.2d 166, 311 N.E. 2d 153 (1974); City of
Sparta v. Brenning, 45 Ill.2d 359, 259 N.E.2d 30 (1970).
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zoned residential.5 In Illinois two cases which have dealt with zoning
ordinances as applied to mobile homes, County of Cook v. Hoytt and
County of Winnebago v. Hartman,7 found that the mobile home was not
prohibited.
Most jurisdictions make no distinction between public zoning ordi-
nances and private zoning in the form of covenants, and decisions
interpreting restrictive covenants often cite zoning cases as authority.'
There are, however, principles applicable to restrictive covenants that
do not govern zoning ordinances.' The owner of real estate has the right
to convey it subject to any condition or restriction he or she chooses to
impose as long as the restriction doesn't violate public policy or materi-
ally impair its beneficial enjoyment.'" Subsequent purchasers of the
property are bound by the restriction if there is actual or constructive
notice of the covenant."I In Brownfield, the purchasers were aware of the
restriction against mobile homes at the time they purchased the lot."'
5. See, e.g., Town of Greenland v. Hussey, 110 N.H. 269, 266 A.2d 122 (1970).
6. 59 Ill.App.2d 368, 208 N.E.2d 410 (1st Dist. 1965). A house trailer used as a residence
was located in an area zoned F (farming) under a 1940 Cook County zoning ordinance. A
single family residence was permitted in such a district, and the appellate court found
the trailer to be a residence in the commonly accepted meaning of the word since "resi-
dence" was not defined in the ordinance. The court also found the use of the trailer to be
incidental to the use of the property as a dog kennel. Id. at 375, 208 N.E.2d at 413.
7. 104 Ill.App.2d 119, 242 N.E.2d 916 (2d Dist. 1968). A zoning ordinance prohibited
parking a trailer outside an authorized trailer park. The appellate court found a mobile
home placed on a foundation was not a trailer under the ordinance. The ordinance defined
a trailer as "[a] vehicle or similar portable structure designed, constructed or intended
for use for human habitation and having no foundation other than wheels, blocks, skids,
jacks or skirtings." Id. at 122, 242 N.E.2d at 917. However, the court cautioned:
We are not to be understood as holding that trailers or mobile homes can be
converted into structures simply by removing the wheels and the hitch and
attaching them to permanent foundations. Our decision is specifically limited
to the facts of this case as applied to the local zoning ordinance. ...
Id. at 124, 242 N.E.2d at 918.
8. See, e.g., Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee, 61 Ill.2d 168, 334 N.E.2d 131
(1975); Manley v. Draper, 44 Misc. 2d 613, 254 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Crawford
v. Boyd, 453 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also Bartke & Gage, supra note 2.
But see Nailman v. Bilodeau, 225 A.2d 758, 760 (Me. 1967), where the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine stated that the decision in Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543
(1964), dealing with a zoning ordinance, was not helpful in resolving the meaning of the
restrictive covenant. For support of this interpretation see also Bartke & Gage, supra note
2, at 516.
9. For a discussion of covenants, see generally McCarthy, supra note 3.
10. Corbridge v. Westminster Presbyterian Church & Soc., 18 Ill. App.2d 245, 260, 151
N.E.2d 822, 830 (2d Dist. 1958).
11. See, e.g., Pagel v. Gisi, 132 Colo. 181, 184-85, 286 P.2d 636, 638 (1955); Corbridge
v. Westminster Presbyterian Church & Soc., 18 II1. App. 2d 245, 260, 151 N.E.2d 822,
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Robert and Mary Ann Collenberger purchased a sectional home, 52
feet long by 24 feet wide, from a mobile home dealer. The home was
built and transported in two separate sections and placed on a concrete
foundation on their lot in the Brownfield Subdivision. A garage was
erected and a family room built between the home and the garage.
Brownfield Subdivision, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation, filed a com-
plaint against the Collenbergers and Rex E. McKee, the seller of the lot
and president of the mobile home sales company, seeking an injunction
to restrain the Collenbergers from occupying the home as a residence on
grounds it was within a restrictive covenant which prohibited temporary
structures or mobile homes from being used as a residence.'3 Affirming
the decision of the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the structure was within the prohibitory language of the covenant." It
based its decision on a finding that the structure was: (1) advertised as
a mobile home and sold by a mobile home dealer; (2) in no way attached
to the foundation; and (3) capable of being transported to another loca-
tion. '1
In reaching this decision, the supreme court was confronted with con-
.flicting terminology. However, it failed to discuss important structural
distinctions between a mobile home and other factory built housing."
The court did point out that the home was advertised as a double-wide
mobile home,'7 yet the seller described it at trial as a sectional home.'"
830 (2d Dist. 1958). Equity will enforce a restrictive covenant by an injunction. Id.
12. Brief for Appellee at 5-6, Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee, 61 Ill.2d 168, 334
N.E.2d 131 (1975).
13. The restrictive covenant provided:
No building shall be erected on any lot except a one family dwelling house, a
garage and one service building and used exclusively as such. Buildings shall
be permanent structures of an attractive design. . . . No structure of a tempo-
rary character, trailer, basement, tent, shack, mobile home or garage shall be
used on any Lot, at any time, as a residence, either temporarily or permanently.
61 Ill.2d at 169, 334 N.E.2d at 132.
14. Id.
15. 61 Ill.2d at 175-76, 334 N.E.2d at 135.
16. Because double-wide, sectional and modular homes are relatively recent innova-
tions in the housing industry, few courts have had occasion to decide whether a double-
wide or a sectional home belongs in the mobile home category. The Brownfield court could
have looked to Kyritsis v. Fenny, 66 Misc. 2d 329, 320 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1971), where
the New York Supreme Court found that a zoning ordinance restricting mobile homes to
trailer parks did not apply to a modular home. A mobile home was distinguished from a
modular home on grounds that the former is a single entity, complete on arrival at the
home site, and the latter is transported to the construction site in several pieces. This
distinction seems equally applicable to the covenant in Brownfield where the two units
were transported to the lot separately.
17. 61 Ill.2d at 171, 334 N.E.2d at 133. "A double wide mobile home is a mobile home
1976]
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Defendants' attorney argued that the mobile home was converted into
a modular home."9 The mobile home industry itself uses the terms
"double-wide" and "modular" interchangeably. " The court itself cited
Hodes and Roberson, The Law of Mobile Homes, to support the proposi-
tion that modular and sectional homes are in the mobile home cate-
gory.2' Yet it failed to note that Hodes and Roberson also pointed out
that modular housing is conceptually closer to prefabricated housing
than to the mobile home.2
The Brownfield court relied primarily on two cases: Timmerman v.
Gabriel" and Town of Manchester v. Phillips.24 In Timmerman a
double-wide mobile home, each section of which had a steel frame, was
placed on a concrete foundation. The Montana Supreme Court held that
this structure was within the prohibition of a restrictive covenant ban-
ning a "trailer." The essence of the decision was that the covenant
prohibited temporary structures such as trailers because of the nature
of the construction rather than the mobility. While pointing out that the
Timmerman case strongly resembled Brownfield, the Illinois Supreme
Court failed to note a primary distinction between the two types of
structures involved. In Brownfield defendant McKee testified that the
construction methods and materials used in that structure were those
of a modular sectional home rather than of a double-wide mobile home. 5
consisting of two sections combined horizontally at the site while still retaining their
individual chassis for possible future movements." B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, THE LAW
OF MOBILE HOMES 4 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES].
18. 61 Ill.2d at 171, 334 N.E.2d at 133. A sectional home is defined as "a dwelling made
of two or more modular units factory fabricated and transported to the home site where
they are put on a foundation and joined to make a single house." THE LAW OF MOBILE
HOMES, supra note 17, at 4.
19. 61 Ill.2d at 172, 334 N.E.2d at 133. "A modular unit is a factory fabricated trans-
portable building unit designed to be used by itself or to be incorporated with similar units
at a building site into a modular structure to be used for residential, commercial, educa-
tional or industrial purposes." THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES, supra note 17, at 4.
20. The industry refers to a 24 foot wide, two section home as a "double-wide." It is
double only during its life on the production line. When set on a homesite it may be
referred to as a two module home to describe its origin and factory production system.
Mobile Home/Recreational Vehicle Dealer Magazine, Market Study of the Mobile &
Modular Housing Industry 9 (April 1971) [hereinafter cited as Market Study].
21. 61 Ill.2d at 175, 334 N.E.2d at 134-35.
22. THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES, supra note 17, at 11.
23. 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970). Accord, Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (a trailer placed on blocks found to be prohibited by a covenant
banning the use of a trailer as a residence).
24. 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962).
25. Section homes include primarily 2" x 4" on 16 inch centers with a shingled roof.
Defendant's Petition for Appeal at 8, Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee, 61 Ill.2d 168,
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Applying the "nature of the construction" test used in Timmerman, the
construction of the structure in Brownfield more closely resembled a
site-built or prefabricated house than a mobile home.
In Town of Manchester v. Phillips" a mobile home was prohibited
under a zoning bylaw permitting only single-family homes on the prop-
erty.27 According to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the words "mo-
bile home" in the bylaw referred to a species of self-contained unit in
contrast to a conventional house. However, the Brownfield court failed
to distinguish the two cases and point out that the structure in
Brownfield was not self-contained. It was purchased in two sections,
each transported to the site separately on wheels and supports belonging
to the manufacturer; neither unit was separately capable of providing
living accommodations. 8
The potential mobility of the structure was also discussed by the
Brownfield court." The court points out it could be transported to an-
other location, but so could a conventional frame house." A prefabri-
cated house could also be disassembled and moved, but no one would
contend it is mobile.2 Other decisions have focused on the current use
and immobility of a mobile home rather than the past or potential use
and mobility. In Crawford v. Boyd,"2 trailer homes were not permitted
on the lot in question. A mobile home, with axles and wheels removed
and returned to the manufacturer, placed on a foundation was held not
334 N.E.2d 131 (1975). The walls of the Collenbergers' home had studding of the usual
dimensions and spacing; asphalt shingles covered the pitched roof of the completed struc-
ture. 19 Ill.App.3d at 380, 311 N.E.2d at 199.
26. 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1972).
27. Accord, Town of Marblehead v. Gilbert, 334 Mass. 602, 137 N.E.2d 921 (1956),
where a trailer did not constitute a one family house. See also Bartke & Gage, supra note
2, at 501, where the authors point out that Massachusetts has taken the most extreme
position in excluding mobile homes from single family districts, i.e., "once a trailer,
always a trailer." Contra, Lower Merion Twp. v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35
(1946) (a house trailer on blocks held to be a dwelling); Lescault v. Zoning Bd. of Cumber-
land, 91 R.I. 277, 162 A.2d 807 (1960) (a trailer held to be a dwelling); Sioux Falls v.
Cleveland, 75 S.D. 548, 70 N.W.2d 62 (1955) (a trailer house held to be a dwelling house);
State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 204, 449 P.2d 806 (1969) (a mobile home held to be a single
family dwelling).
28. 19 Ill.App.3d at 380, 133 N.E.2d at 199.
29. 61 Ill.2d at 176, 334 N.E.2d at 135.
30. Manley v. Draper, 44 Misc. 2d 613, 254 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Hussey v.
Ray, 462 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
31. See In re Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 364, 140 A.2d 11, 14 (1958). See also Comment, Mobile
Homes in North Carolina: Residence or Vehicle, 50 N.C. L. REV. 612, 619 (1972).
32. 453 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
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a trailer home within the meaning of a restriction.33 The Texas Civil
Appeals Court stressed that the question was not future use but the use
of the structure at the time in question. The New York Supreme Court
found that an expandable mobile home 4 was converted to a permanent
residence when it was placed on a foundation of concrete piers with the
undercarriage, wheels and springs removed in Manley v. Draper."3 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Anstine v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment," decided that a mobile home was rendered immobile and
permanently affixed to the land when it was placed on a concrete foun-
dation. Although it could be moved, it would involve the same degree
of difficulty and harm to the structure that would accompany the mov-
ing of a conventional home.
In relation to the issue of mobility the Brownfield court stressed that
the home was in no way attached to its concrete foundation. Three steel
I-beams were placed on concrete blocks which were on top of a concrete
foundation. The home's two sections, fastened together by angle irons
and 16-penny nails, rested on the I-beams, but were not cemented,
welded or attached to them. 7 However, other cases have found similar
structures to be affixed to the realty when placed on a foundation and
attached to utilities, without focusing on the actual method of attach-
ment.38
The court also may have decided differently had it considered the
standard tests for determining whether a chattel has been annexed to
the realty: (1) actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant
to it; (2) the purpose for which the property was attached; and (3) the
intention of the person making the annexation to make a permanent
33. See also In re Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 11 (1958) (a trailer, mobile when brought
to the lot, used as a dwelling and permitted in a residential zone). Contra, Jones v. Beiber,
251 Iowa 969, 103 N.W.2d 364 (1960) (the court held an 8 foot by 51 foot mobile home
retained its basic characteristic of being "designed to be hauled"). Id. at 973, 103 N.W.2d
at 366.
34. An expandable mobile home consists of one or more rooms that fold or telescope
while the unit is being transported; it is expanded at the site to provide additional living
space. Market Study, supra note 20, at 9.
35. 44 Misc. 2d 613, 254 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
36. 411 Pa. 33, 39, 190 A.2d 712, 715 (1963).
37. 61 Ill.2d at 170, 334 N.E.2d at 132.
38. See, e.g., In re Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 11 (1958) (a trailer, not on a foundation
but on cinder blocks, held to be affixed to the realty); State ex rel. Herzog v. Miller, 170
Misc. 1063, 11 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (a lunch wagon placed on a brick foundation
and connected to sewer, water, gas and electric lines found to be affixed to the realty);
Coming v. Town of Ontario, 204 Misc. 38, 121 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (a trailer held
to be affixed to the realty because of sanitary and electrical connections).
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accession to the freehold. 9 Lack of intent readily results in a finding that
a mobile home is not a permanent part of the realty.'" The Collenber-
gers' intent was to establish a permanent residence; the fact that the
unit was transported to their lot and not built there should not be
controlling. Presumably, had the home been sold as a prefabricated
house or labelled a modular house and transported to the lot on trucks
rather than detachable running gears and wheels, no question as to its
future mobility would have arisen.'"
A factor of paramount importance in construing a covenant, which
the Brownfield court failed to discuss, is the intention of the parties at
the time the covenant was imposed and the circumstances surrounding
its imposition."' In 1965 when the covenant was imposed 2 mobile
homes were vastly different from the modular-mobile homes of the
1970's.'3 The type of structure at issue in Brownfield was neither in
existence nor contemplated by the covenantor at the time the restriction
was imposed." Similar covenants have been interpreted as intending to
ban an influx of travel trailers occupied by transients but not perma-
nently affixed mobile homes.'" When there is doubt about the intent of
a restrictive covenant, all doubt is resolved in favor of the free use of
the land." Emphasizing the inapplicability of many restrictive cove-
nants, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas in Yeager v. Cassidy7 pointed
out that
. . . in most situations the restrictive covenants were imposed before
39. Ward v. Earl, 86 Ill. App. 635, 639 (1st Dist. 1899) citing Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487,
496 (1887).
40. See Nance v. Waldrop, 258 S.C. 69, 187 S.E.2d 226 (1972) where a trailer temporar-
ily placed on a lot was barred by a covenant restricting the use of the property for
residential purposes. The trailer owner intended to live in it only until he could build a
house on the land.
41. See generally Mobile Homes in Kansas, supra note 2, at 90.
41.1. Kessler v. Palmer, 3 Ill.App.3d 901, 904, 278 N.E.2d 813, 816 (3d Dist. 1972).
42. Defendant's Petition for Rehearing at 3, Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee, 61
Ill.2d 168, 334 N.E.2d 131 (1975).
43. Mobile homes as wide as fourteen feet were introduced in a few states in 1968, and
sixteen foot, eighteen foot, and double-wide versions followed. Market Study, supra note
20, at 3,5.
44. See Kyritsis v. Fenny, 66 Misc. 2d 329, 330, 320 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (Sup. Ct. 1971)
(the court pointed out that the drafters of the 1962 zoning ordinance could not have
intended to include all modular homes, since modular homes had been available in the
area for only two years).
45. See, e.g., Manley v. Draper, 44 Misc. 2d 613, 615, 254 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (Sup. Ct.
1963); Crawford v. Boyd, 453 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
46. See, e.g., Newton v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 374 Ill. 50, 56, 27 N.E.2d 821, 824 (1940);
Kessler v. Palmeri, 3 Ill.App.3d 901, 908, 278 N.E.2d 813, 818 (3d Dist. 1972); Naiman v.
Bilodeau, 225 A.2d 758, 759 (Me. 1967).
47. 20 Ohio Misc. 251, 253 N.E.2d 320 (1969).
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the advent of the modern mobile home, and therefore, were not within
the contemplation of the imposer of the restrictions. . . . Unless such
dwellings are expressly and explicitly excluded by the terms of a protec-
tive covenant, their use should not be enjoined, provided that in each
case, the dwelling otherwise conforms to the spirit of the restriction.48
Considering that the most essential element in construing a restrictive
covenant is the intent of the covenantor, it is difficult to see how the
intent of a person imposing a covenant in 1965 could have been to
exclude a type of structure that did not come into existence until after
1968.
Since it is not clear the intent behind the covenant was to ban all
unconventional forms of housing, the decision in Brownfield extends the
scope of the covenant by implication. Such a construction encourages
vagueness and generality in both private and public zoning restrictions.
Other jurisdictions have refused to restrict the use of land where the
restriction was not sufficiently particularized to reveal an intent to ex-
clude that type of dwelling."
Another factor the court could have considered in interpreting the
language of the covenant is existing applicable legislation. 0 Illinois, by
statute, specifically excludes a mobile home placed on a permanent
foundation from the definition of a mobile home.5" The supreme court
opinion in Brownfield made no mention of the legislative definition. 2
48. Id. at 256, 253 N.E.2d at 323-24.
49. See Manley v. Draper, 44 Misc. 2d 613, 254 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 1963), which
dealt with a covenant prohibiting trailers. The court found if it were the covenantor's
intention to exclude all construction except homes of a particular type, size, and cost, the
restriction should be specifically phrased to eliminate the ambiguity. Accord, Hussey v.
Ray, 462 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (a restrictive covenant prohibiting trailers did
not bar a mobile home).
50. Legislation can be considered in interpreting a restrictive covenant. Swigart v.
Richards, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 37, 40, 178 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
51. 'Mobile home' means a structure designed for permanent habitation and
so constructed as to permit its transport on wheels, temporarily or permanently
attached to its frame, from the place of its construction to the location, or
subsequent locations, at which it is intended to be a permanent habitation and
designed to permit the occupancy thereof as a dwelling place for 1 or more
persons, provided that any such structure served by individual utilities and
resting on a permanent foundation, with wheels, tongue and hitch permanently
removed, shall not be construed as a 'mobile home.'
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 /2, § 712.1 (1973), as amended (Supp. 1974). But cf ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95 /, § 1-128 (1973), for a definition of "house trailer."
52. At the appellate level, Justice Trapp, in a dissenting opinion, refers to the statutory
definition and concludes: "It constrains credibility to conclude that upon completion the
building was either structually or legally a mobile home." Brownfield Subdivision, Inc.




Finally, aesthetic grounds might have been used to justify the deci-
sion in Brownfield, yet the only reference to the character of the neigh-
borhood was in the appellate court opinion which pointed out that the
existing homes in the subdivision were of the conventional type, ranging
from single-story ranch homes to two-story homes. 3 After viewing the
premises, the trial court found the Collenbergers' home "neat and at-
tractive."54 However, the supreme court found that the dwelling was
prohibited by the covenant because it had the appearance of a mobile
home. 5 Other cases which have excluded mobile homes because of their
appearance have made a definite finding of a unfavorable aesthetic
impact and a potential decrease in the value of surrounding property. 5
Without such a finding, the exclusion of a structure because it has the
appearance of a mobile home appears arbitrary.57
Under the Brownfield decision a once mobile home is fated to remain
one, regardless of the owner's intent to make it a permanent residence.
Illinois courts confronting the issue of whether a mobile home affixed
to the realty is prohibited by an ordinance restricting mobile homes to
trailer parks will be constrained to ban the mobile home from a residen-
tial area. The Brownfield decision has already resulted in one reversal
by an Illinois circuit court judge in Moore v. McDaniel." Three units,
described at various times as a "trailer," "mobile home" and "modular
house" were moved onto a lot. The court initially held a restrictive
covenant prohibiting "trailer houses" did not bar the structure in ques-
tion. After the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Brownfield, the trial
judge reversed his earlier ruling.
From the 8 foot by 35 foot trailer of the 1930's has evolved the mobile
or sectional home of the 1970's, often indistinguishable from a conven-
tional home and closely akin to the prefabricated dwelling. It is an
attractive alternative to the increasingly expensive59 conventional home.
53. 19 Ill.App.3d at 375, 311 N.E.2d at 195.
54. Id. at 375, 311 N.E.2d at 196.
55. 61 Ill.2d at 176, 334 N.E.2d at 135.
56. See, e.g., Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964) (the court found
that no matter how elaborately built, a mobile home is often detrimental to surrounding
property); County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Cmwlth. 357, 315 A.2d 335 (1973) (the
court specifically found a trailer would adversely affect property values). But see Anstine
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 190 A.2d 712 (1973) (there was evidence the
mobile home would enhance the value of surrounding property).
57. For a discussion of the exclusion of mobile homes on aesthetic grounds, see also
Bair, Mobile Homes-A New Challenge, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 286, 299 (1967).
58. No. 74CH2515 (20th Cir. Ct. Ill., filed July 28, 1975).
59. In 1973 the average retail price of a mobile home was $7,770, while the median sales
price of a site-built home was $32,000. Mobile & Modular Housing Dealer Magazine, A
Market Study of 1972-1973 Mobile Home Manufactured Housing & Special Unit Produc-
tion Shipments 12 (No Date).
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According to the 1970 census, 7.8 million persons resided year round in
some 3.4 million mobile homes; only forty per cent of them were located
in mobile home parks.6" The Brownfield decision will force many more
mobile home dwellers to locate in mobile home parks which are fre-
quently less than desirable. Most mobile home parks are in areas zoned
for business or industrial purposes on the theory the operation of a
mobile home park is a business."
The Brownfield opinion effectively discriminates against an essential
form of housing construction. That it is unrealistic to bar innovative
methods of construction was pointed out by the New York Supreme
Court in Kyritsis v. Fenny:2
Today with the urban housing crisis, it would be unrealistic to exclude
from residential zones all modular construction, since people are seek-
ing dwelling space which is readily available at lower cost. 3
The Illinois Supreme Court has utlimately sanctioned a form of
wealth discrimination. With the mounting cost of site-built housing, the
American dream of home ownership will soon be available only to a
small percentage of the population. The majority, who might otherwise
turn to modular, sectional and mobile homes as an alternative, will be
prevented from doing so by restrictive covenants and zoning ordinances.
Julie Badel
60. THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES, supra note 17, at 6.
61. The operation of an apartment building is also a business, yet such dwellings are
commonly located in areas zoned residential. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 2, at 498.
62. 66 Misc. 2d 329, 320 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
63. Id. at 330-31, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
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